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L THE CLAIM OF UNJUST ENRICHMENT IS BROADER THAN THAT
WHICH HAS BEEN NARROWLY DEFINED BY APPELLEE.
As an equitable remedy, unjust enrichment should not be narrowly
construed.

"[T]he doctrine of unjust enrichment was specifically developed to

address situations that did not fit within a particular legal standard but which
nonetheless merited judicial intervention." Allen v. Hall 148 P.3d 939, 945 (Utah
2006).
Unjust enrichment is a general principle, underlying various legal doctrines
and remedies, that one person should not be permitted unjustly to enrich
himself at the expense of another, but should be required to make
restitution of or for the property or benefits received, retained, or
appropriated, where it is just and equitable that such restitution be made,
and where such action involves no violation or frustration of law or
opposition, directly or indirectly, to public policy; unjust enrichment is
defined as the unjust retention of a benefit to the loss of another, or the
retention of money or property of another against the fundamental
principles of justice or equity and good conscience.
27 A.L.R.5th 719 § 2(a).

The above description of unjust enrichment is

persuasive as it relates to this case because Freddie Mac (and GMAC) received a
large windfall as a result of being unjustly enriched by circumstances that are
directly attributable to Mckay Dee Credit Union. Therefore, Freddie Mac should
be required to return the benefit it received from McKay Dee Credit Union.
"To prove ... unjust enrichment, appellant must show, among other things,
that appellees received a benefit "under circumstances that would make it
unjust for the defendant to retain the benefit without paying for it." See,
Geothermal Co. v. Far West Capital WL 463187 quoting Bailey-Allen Co,
v. Kurzet 945 P.2d 180, 189 (Utah Ct.App.1997)
In this case, the circumstances make it absolutely unjust for Freddie Mac to
retain the windfall that it obtained from Mckay Dee Credit Union. In reasonably
1

relying upon the information provided to them about the postponement of the
trustee's sale McKay Dee was unable to defend its second trust deed position and
the Appellees were able to purchase the Property as the only bidder for the amount
of $183,344.61. By their own admission the Appellees were able to then sell the
Property for the approximate amount of $269,900.00. See, Bench Trial Transcript,
p. 8, lines 3-7. Therefore, the benefit conferred upon the Appellees was the profit
of $86,555.39 that Appellees received in selling the Property.
Because the fact patterns in unjust enrichment cases are generally complex
and varying, the court is afforded broad discretion with respect to determination
that a set of facts does or does not warrant conclusion that unjust enrichment has
been shown. See, Restatement of Restitution, Intro, n. (1937). In fact, the court
in Bailey-Allen Co. v. Kurzet 945 P.2d 180 (Utah App. 1997) affirmed the trial
court's award of one-half of the benefit received to be proper measure of damages
in an unjust enrichment case. In other words, because unjust enrichment an
equitable remedy, the court can apply equitable principles to make sure that an
equitable result is obtained.
While the courts have established that there are three elements of unjust
enrichment, these elements are to be construed in an equitable light and to be
liberally construed. For example, in Allen v. Hall 148 P.2d 939 (Utah 2006), the
courted stated, "The facts underlying unjust enrichment claims vary greatly from
case to case, and the doctrine of unjust enrichment was specifically developed to
address situations that did not fit with any particular legal standard but which
2

nonetheless merited judicial intervention." Id. at. 945. This statement was given
as guidance by the Utah Supreme Court to not construe narrowly the elements of
unjust enrichment in order to achieve equity and justice.
Unjust enrichment is an equitable principle and takes special note of
misleading acts of the parties involved.
The mere fact that a third person benefits from a contract between two
others does not make such third person liable in quasi-contract, unjust
enrichment, or restitution. There must be some misleading act, request for
services, or the like, to support such an action.
See, Knight v. Post 748 P.2d 1097, 1101 (Utah Ct.App.1988) quoting
Commercial Fixtures and Furnishings, Inc. v. Adams, 564 P.2d 773, 774 (Utah
1977).
A significantly misleading act is present in this case. In April of 2001, McKay Dee
received a notice of trustee's sale from the first lienholder that the Property would
be sold at trustee's sale on May 15, 2001. See Record, Plaintiffs Exhibit 12.
McKay Dee prepared itself to defend its position by issuing a check in preparation
to attend the trustee's sale and bid on the Property. See Bench Trial Transcript
page 40. When McKay Dee called the sales line provided for in the notice of
trustee's sale, to ascertain the status of the May 15, 2001 sale McKay Dee was
advised that the sale had been postponed until May 18, 2001 to be held at the same
time and same location. See Bench Trial Transcript page 41. Again, McKay Dee
prepared itself to defend its position by issuing a check and attending the
postponed sale on May 18, 2001. But nobody was at the sale. See Bench Trial
Transcript pages 41-42. In reasonably relying upon the information provided to

3

them about the postponement of the trustee's sale McKay Dee was unable to
defend its position and the property was sold to the beneficiary of the first deed of
trust. Thus, Freddie Mac acquired property as the only bidder for the amount of
$183,344.61 (see Trustee's Deed p.2, Defendants Exhibit #1) when that property
was worth at least $269,900.00, the amount of Freddie Mac's sale to a third party.
Therefore, the benefit conferred upon Freddie Mac was the profit of $86,555.39
that Appellants received in eventually selling the property. See Bench Trial
Transcript page 15, lines 13-14.
The trial court was concerned by the by the windfall received by Freddie
Mac:
"THE COURT: Well, and the other things is, I mean apparently Freddie
Mac's the only one that shows up, they buy the property for 183,000 and
turn around and sell it for 269 and again, I mean that's a windfall for
Freddie Mac, right, 80 something thousand dollars? And I get the
impression that it's okay for us to get that benefit. But, you know if you
really want to sue somebody it's not us. We're not involved. It's
somebody else's fault and again I'm struggling with this concept that it's
okay for Freddie Mac to reap the benefits of this windfall, but we're not
responsible for anything I mean it just - " See, Bench Trial Transcript page
14, lines 10-20.
Clearly the extra benefit received by Freddie Mac is bothersome to more than just
the Appellant.
With regard to the three elements of unjust enrichment, such are clearly met
in this case. These elements include 1) a benefit conferred on one person by
another; 2) appreciation or knowledge by the conferee of the benefit; and, 3) the
acceptance or retention by the conferee of the benefit under such circumstances as

4

to make it inequitable for the conferee to retain the benefit without payment of its
value. In this situation McKay Dee Credit Union conferred a benefit upon Freddie
Mac and GMAC because Freddie Mac and GMAC not only obtained the value of
McKay Dee Credit Union's second trust deed position in the subject property, they
also obtained a substantial profit above and beyond that. The Appellees clearly
knew of the benefit conferred upon them by McKay Dee Credit Union because
they knew that they had purchased the property for the amount of the original loan
that did not include any amounts to a second lien holder. First lienholders are very
conscious of whether or not second lien holders attend a sale. The fact that certain
equity may be available to the foreclosing party is always a part of the analysis.
Finally, Freddie Mac and/or GMAC retained the benefit without payment to
McKay Dee Credit Union of the value of the benefit. See, Bench Trial Transcript
page 15, lines 13-14. The facts and circumstances show that Appellees benefited
from this situation and the amount in excess of $86,000.00. That the benefit, upon
Appellees by McKay Dee Credit Union's non-attendance at the actual sale which
was induced by Appellants and their agent. Appellees received a benefit which
directly results from McKay Dee's non-attendance at the sale and which was
precipitated by the conduct of Appellees or its agent as to the misinformation of
the postponed sale date.
As to a potential wrongful foreclosure claim, such an argument is irrelevant
because the Trustee who may have conducted a wrongful foreclosure is an agent
of the Appellees and did not receive any of the benefit which was conferred upon
5

the Appellees. McKay Dee chose to prosecute its claim against the party who
received the monetary benefit from the misinformation as to the postponed sale
date. Moreover, the Appellees are responsible for the conduct of their agent at the
sale and therefore it is irrelevant. In addition, it is also irrelevant that McKay Dee
obtained a separate judgment against the Calls. Had McKay Dee not sought a
judgment from the Calls, there would be a failure to mitigate argument. McKay
Dee's causes of action as they relate to Appellees are independent and separate
from the claims of which they have as they relate to the Calls. Moreover, the
damages available against the Calls were limited by the amount of the promissory
note. The damages which McKay Dee suffered as a result of Appellants' unjust
enrichment are of significantly greater value.

II. APPELLANT HAS PROPERLY MARSHALED THE EVIDENCE
RELATING TO THE CHALLENGED FINDING OF FACT.
Appellee argues that McKay Dee must marshal the evidence regarding the
trial court's finding of fact which is challenged. Finding of Fact number four
states "it is not clear to this Court if Mr. Shirra wrote the wrong date for the sale
down, or if GMAC provided the wrong date." See, Finding of Fact #4. The only
evidence in the record which supports this conclusion is as follows:
Q: "But it's also possible that you wrote down the incorrect date, correct?"
A: "There is that possibility."
See, Bench Trial Transcript, page 54, lines 21 to 23.
6

The testimony which the trial court had to be weighed against the above
evidence and which the trial court apparently ignored is as follows:
Mr. Shirra stated: "The sale date ended on this notice is May 15 of 2001,
11:30 a.m. on that date both John and I attended the sell prepared to bid on the sale
and as instructed we had a $5,000.00 certified check, to proceed with bidding on
the sale.
Q: "And what happened when you arrived at the sale?"
A: "There was nobody there."
Q: "When nobody was there, were you concerned?"
A: "Can't say I was overly concerned. It happened several times before."
Q: "What did you do after returning back to the office?"
A: "Came back to the office, contacted the sale hotline, which again is
advertised in this document. I was given the date that the sale was
rescheduled for 5/18, May the 18th, which is three days later."
Q: "And did you write that information on the Notice of Trustee Sale?"
A: "I did. I have it noted here in my handwriting."
Q: "Therefore, did you receive any notice of a sale to be held on May 18,
2001?"
A: "No, I didn't."
Q: "Did you attend the sale that A: "I attended the sale on May the 18th at 11:30 a.m."
Q: "And was anybody there?"

A: "No"
See, Bench Trial Transcript, page 40, lines 15 to Page 41, line 25.
The fact that Mr. Shirra had later mentioned in the trial that it was
"possible" that he wrote the wrong sale date down as a result of cross-examination
is insufficient information for the court to conclude as it did. His explanation of a
possibility was in terms of the context in which counsel put the question to him
which was basically that anything is possible. However, it is clear from Mr.
Shirra's direct examination that his best recollection is that he wrote down what
information he was told on the sale line.
Additional testimony contrary to findings of Fact #4 is as follows:
Q: "Looking at Plaintiffs Exhibit 12 as well, there's handwriting on that
exhibit that indicates the sale date, or indicates the date of May 18,
2001, Correct?"
A: "Correct."
Q:

"And that's your handwriting, Correct?"

A: "It is."
Q: "Is it possible that you could have written down the incorrect date for
the sale?"
A: "I wrote that down and so I got it from the sale line."
See, Bench Trial Transcript, page 54, lines 5 through 15.
The trial court did not properly weigh the evidence based upon the
"preponderance of the evidence" standard. Preponderance of the evidence means
8

whichever evidence is of the greater weight and which is most convincing and
satisfactory. See, MUJI 2.18. When the evidence submitted by Mr. Shirra that he
recalls hearing the sale line tell him that the date was May 18th is weighed against
his statement upon cross-examination that it was merely possible that something
else could have happened, the better conclusion is that which is contained in his
direct examination.

Because this is the only evidence weighing against Mr.

Shirra's direct testimony, it should not carry the greatest weight. The evidence is
the record does not show Mr. Shirra's prior testimony should be completely
discounted by the court based merely upon a question presented on crossexamination which was not developed any further.
Because the only evidence which could possibly support the Court's
Finding of Fact #4 is Mr. Shirra's testimony that it was possible he wrote the
wrong date down rather than heard it wrong, Appellant has sufficiently marshaled
the evidence. That statement which was mentioned in Appellant's Opening Brief
satisfied McKay Dee's burden to marshal. See, West Valley City v. Majestic
INV. CO. 818 P.2d 1311,1315 (Utah App. 1991). That is the only scrap of
evidence which purportedly supports Finding of Fact #4. When all of the evidence
is concerned relating to this issue, it is clear that Mr. Shirra's best recollection was
that he did hear the information from the sales line, not the remote possibility that
he might have written down the wrong date. In any event, it is also very important
to note that Appellees did not submit any evidence to the contrary relating to Mr.
Shirra's testimony. There was no evidence that came in at the trial court to
9

contradict Mr. Shirra's best recollection regarding the information he received
from the sale line.
In addition, there is no contrary evidence that was submitted by Defendants
at the trial to contradict the testimony of Mr. Shirra as to his best recollection of
having written down that information upon being told by the sale line. Appellees
assert that the Trustee actually came to the sale location and postponed the sale on
May 15, 2001. See, Appellees' Brief page 3. However, the Appellees did not
submit any evidence which supports the assertion that the Trustee actually did
attend the sale to postpone it.

Appellants burden at trial was to show by a

preponderance of the evidence the validity of the facts supporting their claims.
Clearly the statement that it was a "possibility" fits within the scope of the
preponderance of the evidence standard. Mr. Shirra's statement of a possibility
does not reduce the fact that the McKay Dee Credit Union had met its burden to
show that it was more likely than not that the wrong sale date was given by the
sale telephone line.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, unjust enrichment is an equitable theory which should be
applied in a flexible manner. The Appellees received a substantial benefit from
McKay Dee Credit Union as a result of McKay Dee Credit Union's nonattendance at the sale which was precipitated by the wrong information set forth
by Appellees' agent. Appellant respectfully requests that the court apply equitable
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principles in this matter to remand this case to the trial court to reverse the
findings of the trial court to conform to the evidence and to apply properly the
unjust enrichment case law.
DATED this S^

day of February, 200*

^O

Darin Hammc
Attorneys for Appellant.
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BENCH TRIAL TRANSCRIPT EXCERPTS

A

APPELLEE'S BRIEF EXCERPT

B

FINDING OF FACT EXCERPT

C

TRUSTEE'S DEED P. 2

D

PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBIT 12

E
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1

Memorandum in Opposition that this profit is the benefit

2

conferred upon the defendants - that the benefit conferred

3

upon the Defendants was $86,000.

4

our summary judgment motion purposes is plaintiff did not pay

5

this amount to the defendants and this is admitted in its

6

Memorandum in Opposition.

7

is the benefit, because I really don't understand what the

8

benefit is, this amount was paid by a third party purchaser,

9

not the plaintiff.

But the key for the, for

This amount, this $86,000, if this

Based on that, Plaintiff can't argue that

10

it conferred a benefit upon the defendants and again, the

11

summary judgment should be issued.

12

Further, pursuant to Rule 56 and as stated earlier,

13

we began by looking at the pleadings.

Now we can look at the

14

depositions and Affidavits of Plaintiff to show that no

15

benefit was conferred by the plaintiff upon the defendants.

16

Plaintiff in this Motion for Summary Judgment has failed to

17

show any evidence or support in its Memorandum in Opposition

18

that plaintiff conferred a benefit upon the defendants.

19

our Motion for Summary Judgment defendants filed Affidavits

20

by Freddie Mac and GMAC supporting the fact that plaintiff

21

did not confer a benefit upon them.

22

Affidavit of Mr. Cameron Shirra, the Affidavit filed by

23

Plaintiff in Support of its Motion for Opposition, nowhere is

24

it mentioned or asserted in this Affidavit that plaintiff

25

conferred a benefit upon the defendants.

In

However, we look at the

It says nothing to

1

admissions they've, they've only alleged one cause of action

2

against GMAC and Freddie Mac-

3

cause of action against First American Title Insurance

4

Agency, the Trustee, but they have not been served.

5

They've alleged a separate

If they need to dismiss this case and file a

6

separate action, maybe that's what they need to do.

7

their own admissions they've only alleged one cause of action

8

against GMAC and Freddie Mac.

9

they haven't served First American Title Insurance Agency.

10

But by

They haven't, and like I said

THE COURT: Well, and the other thing is, I mean

11

apparently Freddie Mac's the only one that shows up, they buy

12

the property for 183,000 and turn around and sell it for 269

13

and again, I mean that's a windfall for Freddie Mac, right,

14

80 something thousand dollars?

15

it's okay for us to get that benefit.

16

really want to sue somebody it's not us.

17

It's somebody else's fault and again I'm struggling with this

18

concept that it's okay for Freddie Mac to reap the benefits

19

of this windfall, but we're not responsible for anything.

20

mean it just -

And I get the impression that
But, you know if you
We're not involved.

21

MR. DEHAAN: It is a windfall.

22

think under the foreclosure rules that's allowed.

23

follow every statutory -

24
25

It is a benefit.

I

I

They

THE COURT: [inaudible] but Mr. Hammond's going to
tell us, you know, if we got it right, if we'd known when the
14

1

day of the sale is we'd have been there to bid on that

2

property too, and I don't know maybe they would have outbid

3

Freddie Mac.

I don't know.

4

MR. DEHAAN: Yeah, that's what their argument is.

5

THE COURT: Shouldn't they have been given the

6
7

opportunity to be there?
MR. DEHAAN: That's what their argument is.

But

8

like I said, there's no finding for wrongful foreclosure

9

filed against GMAC Mortgage or Freddie Mac by plaintiff's own

10
11

admissions.
In addition, even if we were to go there the

12

windfall, I'm confused as to what benefit plaintiffs

13

conferred upon the defendants.

14

profit, wasn't paid by the plaintiff.

15

party purchaser.

16

because you received this profit we, although we didn't pay

17

it, you should pay us for, for the loss that we have, despite

18

the fact that we've already got a judgment against the

19

borrower's for $25,000.

20

enrichment claim says, you know, it's an equitable remedy,

21

unjust enrichment.

22

the fact matter.

23

The windfall, the $86,000
It was paid by a third

I don't see how they can come in and say

The Supreme Court under an unjust

It's when no other remedies sort of fit

Here there's a breach of contract claim already

24

been filed and entered in favor of the plaintiff and they've

25

collected probably close to $20,000 on this.
15

1

attended?

2

A

Yes.

3

Q

Did you do anything else to identify whether or not

4

the sale had been conducted, other than contact the

5

telephone, that telephone number?

6

A

Well, as I indicated, I think I was informed that

7

we would be notified when it was rescheduled so we just

8

received payments and continued on with the loan.

9
10

Q

A

It is another Notice of Trustee Sale.

It's dated

April 12th, of 2001.

13
14

Can

you identify that document for the record?

11
12

Okay, would you now take a look at Exhibit 12?

Q

And what did you do when you received that Notice

of Sale?

15

A

The sale date ended on this Notice is May 15th of

16

2001, 11:30 a.m.

On that date both John and I attended the

17

sale prepared to bid on the sale and as instructed we had a

18

$5,000 check, certified check, to proceed with bidding on the

19

sale.

20

Q

And what happened when you arrived at the sale?

21

A

There was nobody there.

22

Q

When nobody was there, were you concerned?

23

A

Can't say I was overly concerned.

It had happened

24 J several times before.
25

Q

What did you do after returning back to the office?
40

1

A

Came back to the office, contacted the sale

2

hotline, which again is advertised in this document.

3

given the date that the sale was rescheduled for 5/18, May

4

the 18th, which is three days later.

5
6

Q

And did you write that information on the Notice of

Trustee's Sale?

7

A

I did.

8

Q

So the date 5/15 of

9

A

5/15/01 has been circled.

10

I was

I have it noted here in my handwriting.
x

01 has been circled?
I'd drawn a line out to

the side and written the date 5/18/01.

11

Q

Did you write the - any new time down?

12

A

No, I didn't write a time down on it.

13

Q

Why not?

14

A

I just, at the time assumed I would be prepared and

15
16
17

go to the sale on 5/18 at the same time.
Q

Did the hotline tell you that it would be held at

the same time of day?

18

A

It must have.

19

Q

Therefore, did you receive any written notice of a

20

sale to be held on May 18th, 2001?

21

A

No, I didn't.

22

Q

Did you attend the sale that -

23

A

I attended that sale on May the 18th at 11:30 a.m.

24

Q

And was anybody there?

25 I

A

No.
41

1

Q

What did you do when nobody was there at that sale?

2

A

I returned to the credit union.

I don't have the

3

notes that I contacted the sale line or anything, however,

4

the Call's had been making payments to the loan.

5

received two payments to the loan that date.

6

it had been worked out with the Call's again and the loan was

7

proceeding forth as before.

8

Q

9

worked out?

10

A

11

I had

I assumed that

Did the Call's tell you that the loan had been

I remember a conversation with David in which he

said that he had worked out an agreement with them.

12

Q

Would you take a look at Exhibit 13, please?

13

A

Yes.

14

Q

Can you identify that document for the Court?

15

A

It is a check issued by the credit union and

16

stamped as a certified check.

It is dated 5/15/01.

It is

17

the check that I prepared to go to the sale on that date of

18

5/15/01.

19

Q

And -

20

A

It's in the amount of $5,000.

21

Q

Did you use that check?

22

A

When the sale did not take place I did not use the

23 J check.

On the endorsement of the check I have written a

24

notation "not used for purposes intended" and I would just

25

re-process the check through our system to show that it was
42

1

A

On those dates and times, yes.

2

Q

And then you testified earlier that you attended

3

the sale, when in fact you have no recollection of actually

4

attending the sale on May 15th, 2001; is that your testimony?

5

A

That is, that is what I said.

6

Q

Looking at Plaintiff's Exhibit 12 as well, there's

7

handwritiiig on that exhibit that indicates the sale date, or

8

indicates the date of May 18th, 2001, correct?

9

A

Correct.

10

Q

And that's your handwriting, correct?

11

A

It is.

12

Q

Is it possible that you could have written down the

13

incorrect date for the sale?

14
15

Q

I understand where you got it.

Is it possible you

wrote down an incorrect date?

18
19

I wrote that down and so I got it from the sale

line.

16
17

A

A

I would say that there, any possibility.

The same

as the po.ssibility of them having the wrong date.

20

Q

That's right, it's possible that that's the correct

21

date.

22

incorrect date, correct?

But it's also possible that you wrote down the

23

A

There is that possibility.

24

Q

And that date is handwritten by you, correct?

25

A

That'is right, uh-huh (affirmative).
54

The testimony of McKay Dee's primary witness, Mr. Shirra, was inconsistent and
contradictory. For example, under direct examination Mr. Shirra stated that he attended
the foreclosure sale on May 15, 2001. R. 303, Bench Trial Transcript p. 40. However, in
his deposition and under cross examination, Mr. Shirra admitted that he could not say
whether he went to the sale on that date. R. 303, Bench Trial Transcript pp. 52-53. In fact,
in view of his testimony that he called the foreclosure trustee's bid line on that date, it is
unlikely that he attended the sale. If he had, he would have heard the Trustee postponing
the sale and known that the sale was to be held on May 17, 2001. He would not have had
to call the hotline if he had heard the postponement of the sale on May 15, 2001.
This inability to accurately remember dates is important because it bolsters the
admission Mr. Shirra made on cross examination. His testimony at trial under direct
examination was that, when he called the sale hotline on May 15, 2001, he was given the
date of May 18, 2001 as the new date for the foreclosure sale. R. 303, Bench Trial
Transcript p. 41. However, when cross examined, Mr. Shirra admitted that he may have
written down the wrong date. R. 303, Bench Trial Transcript p. 54. McKay Dee failed to
mention this inconsistency and explain its importance to Mr. Shirra's admission on cross
examination. Since this was important evidence bearing on the question of whether the
trial court's finding was in error, and it was not marshaled by McKay Dee, McKay Dee
failed in its duty to comprehensively present every scrap of evidence introduced at trial
that supported the trial court's findings.
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FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The mortgage foreclosure sale was originally set for May 15, 2001. McKay Dee

Credit Union personnel believed the date of sale was moved to May 18, 2001. Mr.
Shirra, Vice-President of McKay Dee Credit Union, called the sale telephone line and
wrote down the date of May 18, 2001 on the Notice of Trustee's Sale.
2.

Mr. Shirra testified that he thought the date of the foreclosure sale was May 18,

2001, but admitted on cross-examination that it was possible he wrote the wrong sale date
down.
3.

The foreclosure sale was actually held on May 17, 2001.

4.

It is not clear to this Court if Mr. Shirra wrote the wrong date for the sale down, or

if GMAC provided the wrong date.
5.

The Court finds the Plaintiff conferred no benefit on Defendants.

6.

Plaintiff did not pay money or provide any benefit directly to Defendants.

Plaintiff paid nothing to the Defendants.
7.

Any benefit received by Defendants was conferred by Defendant's own effort in

completing the foreclosure sale.
8.

The Court finds that it is speculation on the part of Plaintiff that it would have

received any excess proceeds.
9.

There is no way to determine if Plaintiff would have prevailed at the foreclosure

sale in any event, and no way to determine if Plaintiff would have been the successful
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WHEREAS, the successor Trustee did, at the time and place of sale, then and there sell, at public
auction to Grantee above named, being the highest bidder thereof, the property described, for the sum of
$133,344.61
NOW, THEREFORE, the successor Trustee, in consideration of the premises recited and of the
sum above mentioned bid and paid by Grantee, the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, and by
virtue of the authority in him, by said Trust Deed, GRANT AND CONVEY unto Grantee above named,
but without any covenant or warranty, express or implied, all that certain property situate in WEBER
County, State of Utah, described as follows:
ALL OF LOT 37, HIGHLANDS BLUFF ESTATES SUBDIVISION. PHASE 4, WEBER
COUNTY, UTAH, ACCORDING TO THE OFFICIAL PLAT THEREOF.
07-398-0001
Together with all the improvements now or hereafter erected on the property, and all easements,
appurtenances, and fixtures now or hereafter a part of the property
First -\mencan Title Insurance Agencv, [nc
Successor Trustee

Date: May 22, 2001
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By Tim A Krueger
Its Director of Foreclosure,TIEO
State of Utah
)
County of Salt Lake )
On the May 22. 2001, personally appeared before me, Tim A. Krueger who being duly sworn did :>ay, that he, the said Tim \.
Krueger, is the Director of Foreclosure/KEO of First \mencan Title Insurance Agencv, Inc , the corporation that executed
the foregoing instrument as Successor Trustee, by authonty of a resolution of its Board of Directors, and said Tim \ . Krueger
duly acknowledged to me that said corporation executed the same as Successor Trustee

Notary Public
"1
DANIELM.SPENDLOVE ,
330 East 4th South
Satt Lake Gty.Utan 84111
My Commission Exoiras
SeptemwrH 2004
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State of Utah

I

Notarv Puolic

EXECUTIVE TRUSTEE SERVICES, INC.
15455 SAN FERNANDO MISSION BLVD
SUITE #208
MISSION HILLS, CA 91345
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T.S.# UT-52410-C
Loan #010621662
Title Order # 563538
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NOTICE OF TRUSTEE'S SALE
The following described real property will be sol^at public auction to the highest bidder payable in
lawful money of the United States AT THE ENTRANCE TO THE COURTHOUSE LOCATED AT 2525
GRANT AVE., OGDEN, UT 84401, ^Jn5/20^^
11:30 AM for the purpose of foreclosing a Trust Deed
dated 1/31/96 and executed by D A V I E H T T ^ X T A N D JULIE S. CALL HUSBAND AND WIFE in favor of
BANK OF UTAH, covering the following real property located in WEBER County:
ALL OF LOT 37, HIGHLANDS BLUFF ESTATES SUBDIVISION. PHASE 4, WEBER COUNTY, UTAH, ACCORDING
TO THE OFFICIAL PL^T THEREOF.
A.P.N. 07-398-0001

Together with all the improvements now or hereafter erected on the property and all easements, appurtenances
and fixtures now and hereafter a part of the property
The address of the property is purported to be 2058 EAST 6225 SOUTH
SOUTH OGDEN, UTAH 84403. The undersigned disclaims liability for any error in the addre'ss. The present
owners reported to be DAVID R. CALL-and JULIE S. CALL.
Bidders must be prepared to tender to the trustee $5,000.00 at the sale and the balance of the purchase
price by 12:00 noon the day following the sale. Both payments must be in the form of a cashier's check or
certified_funds. Cash is not acceptable,

IJaleTii^^
Dated. April 12, 2001

FIRST AMERICAN TITLE INSURANCE
AGENCY, INC.

irector-Foreclosure & REO

THIS COMMUNICATION IS AN ATTEMPT TO COLLECT A DEBT, AND
ANY INFORMATION OBTAINED WILL BE USED FOR THAT PURPOSE.
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